

## THE THOUGHT OF FIGURES OF ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATION ABOUT CALIPHATE: A CASE STUDY IN BANDA ACEH AND WEST JAVA

**Farid Wajdi Ibrahim**

Universitas Islam Negeri Ar-Raniry Banda Aceh, Aceh, Indonesia  
e-mail: farid@ar-raniry.ac.id

**Dicky Wirianto**

STAI Al-Washliyah Banda Aceh, Indonesia  
\*e-mail: dickyan19@gmail.com

**Shohibul Adib**

Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia  
e-mail: adib2279@gmail.com

### Abstract

*This article aims to address the questions related to the support and rejection of figures of Islamic mass organizations to the concept of the caliphate. Some of the previous literature limited the object to the behavior of the Muslim community towards the ideology of the caliphate in the historical context and its relation to the modern state, neglecting the source of inspiration for the caliphate ideology as understood and perceived by figures of mass organization Indonesia. Therefore, using a phenomenological approach, the researchers attempt to fill the gap in this particular issue. This research was conducted in two cities in Indonesia, Aceh and West Java. This form of field study takes a phenomenological approach and thus is exploratory. Interviews and documentation have been used to collect data. This research found three main tendencies of Islamic mass organizations in Aceh and West Java in understanding the concept of the caliphate, textualist-substantive, contextualist-substantive, and ideological-political. Textualist-functionalists see the Islamic caliphate as mandatory, without having to change the ideology or identity of a country. Contextualist-Substantive argues that the Khil fah is a value that does not contradict with Pancasila's state ideology. Ideological and political Islamists believe that the fight to establish an Islamic State, or Daulah Islamiyyah Khil fah, is a necessity and even an obligation.*

**Keywords:** *Caliphate; Islamic community organization; Pancasila*

### Abstrak

*Artikel ini ingin menjawab pertanyaan terkait dukungan dan penolakan tokoh ormas Islam terhadap konsep khil fah. Beberapa literatur terdahulu lebih fokus terhadap sikap kelompok pendukung ajaran khil fah dalam hal sejarah dan kaitannya dengan sistem negara saat ini. Adapun yang mengilhami dari ideologi khil fah dipahami dan diresepsi oleh tokoh-tokoh ormas di Indonesia masih luput dari kajian secara mendalam. Oleh sebab itu, melalui research lapangan dengan pendekatan fenomenologis artikel ini mengisi kekosongan dalam kajian ini. Penelitian ini dilakukan di dua kota yang terdapat di Aceh dan Jawa Barat. Jenis penelitian lapangan (field research) ini bersifat eksploratif, menjadikan fenomenologi sebagai pendekatan kajian ini. Perolehan data dengan interview mendalam kemudian*

---

\* Corresponding author, email: [dickyan19@gmail.com](mailto:dickyan19@gmail.com)

Citation: Ibrahim, Farid Wajdi, Dicky Wirianto and Shohibul Adib. "The Thought of Figures of Islamic Mass Organization About Caliphate: A Case Study in Banda Aceh and West Java" *Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura* 22, no. 2 (2022): 164-181.

[10.22373/jiif.v22y2.9396](https://doi.org/10.22373/jiif.v22y2.9396)

©Universitas Islam Negeri Ar-Raniry. All rights reserved.

# THE THOUGHT OF FIGURES OF ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATION ABOUT CALIPHATE: A CASE STUDY IN Banda Aceh AND West Java

*dianalisa secara deskriptif kualitatif. Penelitian ini menemukan tiga kecenderungan utama ormas-ormas Islam di Aceh maupun Jawa Barat dalam memahami konsep khil fah dan yang menjadikan mereka berada pada posisi antara pro dan kontra, yakni: Pertama, Tekstualis-fungsionalis, mereka adalah ormas yang melihat khil fah Islamiyyah wajib di perjuangkan tanpa harus merubah wajah atau identitas suatu negara. Kedua, Kontekstualis-Substantif. Ormas yang memandang Khil fah sebagai sebuah nilai dan secara esensial tidak bertentangan dengan ideologi negara Pancasila. Ketiga, Ideologis-politis. Ormas yang meyakini bahwa Khil fah sebuah keharusan bahkan kewajiban dengan memperjuangkan tegaknya negara Islam atau Khil fah Daulah Islamiyyah.*

**Kata kunci:** *Khil fah; ormas Islam; Pancasila; Islam*

## مستخلص

يريد هذا المقال الإجابة عن أسئلة تتعلق بدعم ورفض التنظيمات الجماهيرية الإسلامية لمفهوم الخلافة. ركزت بعض الأدبيات السابقة بشكل أكبر على موقف الجماعات الداعمة لتعاليم الخلافة من حيث التاريخ وعلاقتها بنظام الدولة الحالي. أما ما يلهم أيديولوجية الخلافة ، التي تفهمها وتقبلها شخصيات التنظيمات الجماهيرية في إندونيسيا ، فهي لا تزال بعيدة عن الدراسة المتعمقة. لذلك ، من خلال البحث الميداني بمنهج ظاهري ، تملأ هذه المقالة الفراغ في هذه الدراسة. تم إجراء هذا البحث في مدينتين في آتشيه وجاوة الغربية. هذا النوع من البحث الميداني استكشافي ، مما يجعل علم الظواهر هو منهج هذه الدراسة. تم بعد ذلك تحليل البيانات التي تم الحصول عليها من خلال المقابلات المتعمقة وصفيًا ونوعيًا. وجدت هذه الدراسة ثلاثة اتجاهات رئيسية للمنظمات الجماهيرية الإسلامية في آتشيه وجاوة الغربية في فهم مفهوم الخلافة والتي وضعتها في موقف بين الإيجابيات والسلبيات ، وهي: أولاً ، النصيون الوظيفيون ، وهم المنظمات الجماهيرية التي ترى الخلافة الإسلامية واجبة القتال من أجلها دون الحاجة إلى تغيير وجه أو هوية البلد. الثانية ، المحتوى الموضوعي. أورماس التي تنظر إلى الخلافة على أنها قيمة ولا تتعارض أساساً مع أيديولوجية دولة بانكاسيلا. ثالثاً ، أيديولوجي - سياسي. المنظمات التي تعتقد أن الخلافة ضرورة بل واجب للقتال من أجل إقامة دولة إسلامية أو دولة الخلافة الإسلامية.

**الكلمات الرئيسية:** الخلافة؛ المنظمات الإسلامية ؛ بانكاسيلا؛ دين الاسلام

## A. INTRODUCTION

Leadership is the ability to lead a leader. A leader is a person who leads an organizational unit or community group. In English, leadership refers to "leadership power" or "leadership quality." In terms of the phrase, it is an activity or art that is used to affect the conduct of people who have been guided to a common goal.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nourouzzaman Shiddiqi, *Jeram-Jeram Peradaban Muslim* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1996).

Leadership in Arabic is called *al-khil fah*, while leaders are called *al-khal fah*. The primary meaning of the word *khal fah*, whose plural forms *khulaf* and *khal if* are derived from the word *khalafa*, is "substitute",<sup>2</sup> that is, someone who takes the place of someone else's place in some problem.<sup>3</sup> According to Al-Raghib *khil fah* is to replace another, sometimes because of the absence of being replaced, death, or because of the inability to be replaced.<sup>4</sup>

In English dictionaries and encyclopedias *khal fah* means deputy, successor, vicegerent, the title for the highest leader of the Muslim community as a substitute for the prophet.<sup>5</sup> In the Indonesian Encyclopedia, it is defined as the term of Islamic constitutionality, and means the head of state or the highest leader of Muslims.<sup>6</sup> The term *khal fah* first appeared in pre-Islamic Arabic in an Arabic inscription of the 6th century AD. The word caliph in this inscription refers to a kind of king or lieutenant who acts as a representative of the owner of sovereignty in another place. This term in Islamic history is used in the form of caliph Ar-Rasul.<sup>7</sup>

History has recorded that after the death of the prophet a political institution was formally institutionalized and called the caliph.<sup>8</sup> Ab Bakr himself, as the first caliph, called himself a substitute for the apostle to carry out and protect from the prophet's legacy.<sup>9</sup> In this case, in line with the development of the meaning of caliph, the title of caliph in Ab Bakr can also mean as a regulator, a ruler, who leads society.

There are various opinions from several figures about the definition and concept of the caliphate. If mapped broadly, there are at least three main concepts, namely textualist-functional, contextualist-substantive, and ideological-political. Textualist-functional's definition of the caliphate tends to view the caliphate in terms of its function. According to Ibn Khaldun (1406M), the caliphate is a department that serves to lead the ummah in accordance with the Shari'ah's principles in order to guarantee the world's and hereafter's welfare.<sup>10</sup> The caliph in al-Maududi's view was the supreme leader in religious and worldly

---

<sup>2</sup> Ibn Manjar, *Lisn al-'Arab* (Beirut: Dar Sadhr, 1968).

<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Ibn Jarir Al-Tabari, *Jami' al-Bay'an 'an Ta'wil Ayi al-Qur'an* (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1984).

<sup>4</sup> Al-Raghib Al-Asfahani, *Mu'jam Mufrad li Alfz al-Qur'an* (Mesir: Mu'assasah al-Balagh al-Halab, 1961).

<sup>5</sup> T.W. Arnold "Khalifa" dalam M.TH. Houtma, *First Encyclopedia of Islam*, IV (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987).

<sup>6</sup> Tim, *Ensiklopedi Indonesia*, III (Jakarta: Ichiar baru Van Hoeve, 1982).

<sup>7</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1988).

<sup>8</sup> Ibn Taymiyyah, *Minhaj Al-Sunnah Al-Nabawiyah Fi Naqd Kalimat Al-Sy'ah Wa Al-Qadariyyah* (Makkah: Dar al-Baz, n.d.).

<sup>9</sup> Jalil al-Din Al-Suyu'i, *Tarikh Al-Khulaf'ah* (Beirut: Dar al-Thaqafa, 1988).

<sup>10</sup> Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History-Abridged Edition* (Princeton University Press, 2015), 238.

## THE THOUGHT OF FIGURES OF ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATION ABOUT CALIPHATE: A CASE STUDY IN BANDA ACEH AND WEST JAVA

affairs as the successor of the apostle.<sup>11</sup> The same literature comes from ‘Abd Wahhab al-Najj r who states that the caliph is the position of the successor of the bearer of the shar 'ah whose function is to preserve the religion, implement His laws and take care of the world. The caliphate is not simply to regulate and control the administration of the kingdom, taxation, and the conquest of territory. For Mawardi, the caliphate was projected to take over the function and role of the Prophet in maintaining the religion and regulating the politics of life in the world.<sup>12</sup>

The caliphate has been seen as a system by contextualist-substantive. From the viewpoint of the system, ‘Ali Abd al-R ziq (1888) saw the caliphate. ‘Ali Abd al-R ziq, an Egyptians scholar, is well-known for his views on the caliphate. According to him, the caliphate system is a system of government created by humans that aims to justify government by using religion as the main tool. Abd al-Raziq concluded in his book *al-Isl m wa U l al- ukm: Ba th fi al-Khil fah wa al uk mah f al-Isl m* that the caliphate system is not a duty nor a need for Muslims to build and fight for.<sup>13</sup> According to Syahrudin Siregar, this refers to the Prophet Muhammad's sole obligation as a messenger of Islam to mankind, rather than as a king or a country's leader.<sup>14</sup>

According to Ali Abdul Raziq, the ideal country is one that is based on universal humanism that fights for its people, democracy, and social justice, i.e. a secular state that embraces equally Muslims and non-Muslims. The relevance of ‘Ali Abd al-R ziq's ideal state thinking to Pancasila is that if democratic values as well as social justice are based on humanism, that must be given to every human being regardless of religious label, then ‘Ali Abd al-R ziq's ideal state is relevant to Pancasila's philosophy as the founding of the Indonesian state. Indonesia is neither a secular nor a religious state, but rather a hybrid of the two, with religious principles incorporated into official law.<sup>15</sup>

Fatni Erlina's work, in particular, sees Islamic caliphate principles contextualized in Indonesian constitutional procedures, such as the virtue of deliberation being fulfilled through an honest and fair voting system. Islamic law can be applied through enforcing the rule of law

---

<sup>11</sup> Al-Maududi, *Al-Islam Wa Al-Madaniyah Al-Hadisah*, ed. Asep Hikmat (al Qahirah: Dar al-Ansar, 1978), 38.

<sup>12</sup> Al-Mawardi, *Al-Ahkam Al-Sulthaniyyah Wa Al-Wilayat Al-Diniyyah* (Beirut: Darul Kutub Al’Ilmiyyah, 2011), 5.

<sup>13</sup> Ali Abdul Raziq, *Khil fah Dan Pemerintahan Dalam Islam*, Terj. Afif Muhammad (Bandung: Pustaka, 1985), 5.

<sup>14</sup> Syahrudin Siregar, “Islam Dalam Perspektif Sejarah Pemikiran Ali Abdul Raziq,” *JUSPI: Jurnal Sejarah Peradaban Islam* 2, no. 1 (2018): 124–137.

<sup>15</sup> Rido Putra, “Konsep Negara Ideal Ali Abdul Raziq Dan Relevansinya Dengan Pancasila,” *Indonesian Journal of Islami Theology and Philosophy* 1, no. 1 (2019): 45–62, <https://doi.org/10.37700/0033-2909.I26.1.78>.

in a fair and unbiased manner. International relations, within the framework of free and active politics, show the value of global brotherhood.<sup>16</sup> Muzayyin Ahyar discovered that the spirit of the classical Islamic political concept is in the distribution of power, which is incompatible with the spirit of separation of power in modern political concepts, after conducting an extensive literature review using a political institutionalism approach. In addition, Muzayyin Ahyar stressed that the values of justice, problem solving and transparency of the caliphate always have a relationship with various modern political conceptions, especially those relating to government and state administration.<sup>17</sup>

The third category is ideological-political. Literature that examines the caliphate from an ideological and political perspective, as expressed by Jam l al-D n al-Afgh n , Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi, and Rasyid Ridha, and sees the caliphate as global. The growth of political-ideological notions like these has much to do with salafism or even Islamic fundamentalism, which calls for the ummah to return to "pure" Islam, which includes reconstructing Islam's political structure and power, as exhibited by the Prophet Muhammad and his followers.

This idea was later adopted by Ismail al-Faruqi. According to him, the definition of khil fah in the modern era is: first, khil fah applies to all humans and there are no differences in regional backgrounds, skin color, language, and so on; second, Islamic countries will now become the federal provinces of a universal caliphate which all Muslims must always fight for; third, Arab countries in the Middle East must be transformed into a caliphate; fourth, laws originating from the West must be discarded and replaced by sharia; fifth, the sovereignty (h kimiayah) of the khil fah lies not in the hands of individuals, but in the hands of God; sixth, there is no need for a legislative body in the caliphate, because every citizen is a law enforcer in their respective fields guided by sharia; seventh, the interpretation of sharia is the prerogative of the ummah which is carried out by the ulama. So, the concept of khil fah is more of a political ideology (khilafatism) in an effort to uphold a caliphate or an Islamic state (of course with their own version) in the modern era.<sup>18</sup> Azyumardi Azra then questioned the idea of a caliphate in current times, claiming that the caliphate is incompatible with democracy since it conforms to the principle of vox dei vox populi (God's voice is the people's voice).<sup>19</sup>

In addition, seen from its history, according to Ahmad Faidi, the caliphate was not part of religious doctrine, but was nothing more than just a political cultural construction of the

---

<sup>16</sup> Fatni Erlina, "Sistem Khil fah Islamiyah Dalam Perspektif Ketatanegaraan Republik Indonesia," *Jurnal Idea Hukum* 5, no. 1 (2019): 2019.

<sup>17</sup> Muzayyin Ahyar, "Aksi Bela Islam : Islamic Clicktivism and the New Authority of Religious Propaganda in the Millennial Age in Indonesia" 9, no. 1 (2019): 1–29.

<sup>18</sup> Azyumardi Azra et al., *Islam Indonesia 2020* (Yogyakarta: UII Press, 2020).

<sup>19</sup> Azyumardi Azra, "Relevansi Khil fah Di Indonesia," *Kompas*, 2007.

## THE THOUGHT OF FIGURES OF ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATION ABOUT CALIPHATE: A CASE STUDY IN BANDA ACEH AND WEST JAVA

Arab community at that time.<sup>20</sup> The same thing and critically comes from the literature of Ainur Rofiq al-Amin who argue that the caliphate which is understood by some of its supporters, including Hizbut Tahrir, is an inseparable part of the teachings of Islam, as a false claim. The caliphate's organization continued to evolve from Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, Abd Qadim Zallum, till Ata Abu Rashta's period. As a result, the assertion that the caliphate's structure has been perfect since the Prophet's time is a claim without a strong foundation.<sup>21</sup>

Idil Akbar examines the caliphate in two prominent Islamic countries, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran, from a political standpoint. The concept of khilafah in Iran is basically a modification of the Islamic-based government system, especially Shi'ites. Iran tries to implement Islamic sharia, even though it is not purely in the form of a caliphate. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is more inclined to implement a pseudo sharia system by focusing more on the role of the kingdom as the center of interest. It is believed that Saudi Arabia in its governmental system has not really implemented it in its entirety. Although certain parts (such as the existence of the law of stoning, qisas, and others) are still implemented.<sup>22</sup>

Some of the literature about the Khilafah in Indonesia focuses on the relationship between the caliphate and the state, as well as Pancasila's ideology. Jiwandana's work on the concepts of khilafah and Pancasila demonstrates this. Jiwandana concluded that the caliphate was not against Pancasila by pointing to writings authored by Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani, such as *Ni'mat al-Islam*, *Ni'mat al-ukm f al-Islam*, *al-Muwassawa al-Munaqqah bi Abdil al-Qadim Zallum*, *al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah*, and *al-Syakhs*.<sup>23</sup> One of the weaknesses in Jiwandana's research is that he only looks at the substance but has not seen the ideological caliphate where the caliphate is against the political ideology of the state.<sup>24</sup> Taqiyuddin himself calls *ghazw al-tsaqaf* (war or cultural invasion) for those who reject the caliphate and are reluctant to apply Islamic laws to the government system.<sup>25</sup> Sakrim Miharja in his writing stated that there are still groups who want to change the Republic of Indonesia with its Pancasila into an Islamic

---

<sup>20</sup> Ahmad Faidi, "Sistem Kekhalifahan Dan Konstruksi Budaya Politik Arab," *Al-Ihkam* 13, no. 1 (2018).

<sup>21</sup> Ainur Rofiq Al Amin, "Konstruksi Sistem Khilafah Hizbut Tahrir," *Review Politik* 07 (2017).

<sup>22</sup> Idil Akbar, "Khilafah Islamiyah: Antara Konsep Dan Realitas Kenegaraan; Republik Islam Iran Dan Kerajaan Islam Arab Saudi," *Journal of Government and Civil Society* 1, no. 1 (2017): 95–109, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004>.

<sup>23</sup> Ahmad Subekti Jiwandana, "Antara Khilafah Dan Pancasila; Sebuah Jawaban Terhadap Anggapan Khilafah Anti Pancasila," *Kalimah: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama Dan Pemikiran Islam* 16, no. 1 (2018): 35–50.

<sup>24</sup> Muhammad Firdaus, "Konstruksi Makna Ideologi Hizbut Tahrir; Studi Fenomenologi Tentang Makna Ideologi Khilafah Dan Politik Aktivistis Hizbut Tahrir Di Pekanbaru," *Jurnal ILMU KOMUNIKASI* 8, no. 1 (2017): 47–62.

<sup>25</sup> An-Nabhani, *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir (Terj)* (Jakarta: HTI Press, n.d.), 128.

State under the auspices of the Caliphate, even though they have various and different interpretations of the form of the Caliphate.<sup>26</sup>

Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani also declared that the caliphate is the Islamic State's only form of government. The caliphate, according to Taqiyuddin, is "the universal leadership for all Muslims in the world to defend the sharia laws" (*ta b q al-syar 'ah*). Here, the caliphate system is far different from other systems of government such as monarchies, republics, empires, as well as federations and democracies, both in terms of the principles that form the basis of its establishment, thinking, concepts, standards and laws used to serve. Strictly speaking, Taqiyuddin said that the caliphate is a practical political force that serves to apply and enforce Islamic laws in two main ways, namely da'wah and jihad throughout the world.<sup>27</sup>

The struggle for the enforcement of the caliphate system and those who believe that the caliphate is the legacy of the Prophet Muhammad saw is increasingly getting fresh air from Abdullah bin Umar Sulaiman ad-Dumaiji. Through his work, Ad-Dumaiji scientifically discusses the issue of the caliphate, and in one of his concluding points said, "There is no glory and high rank for Muslims, except by re-judging the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger, and fighting to establish the Islamic Khil fah that will protect the religion of Islam and restore the glory and honor of the people and the religion of Islam."<sup>28</sup>

Syaiful Arif looks at the historical relationship of the caliphate represented by HTI and Pancasila. As a trans-national Islamic movement, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as the main bearer of the caliphate in Indonesia seeks to refine views on the basis of the Republic of Indonesia, namely Pancasila. In the 1990s, Pancasila was explicitly accused because it contained religious plurality and ideology. Then in 2012, HTI softened its views by calling Pancasila a set of philosophy as a series of man-made philosophies. Unfortunately as a man-made philosophy, the status of Pancasila remains under Islam this is understood as a divine ideology. The desire to enforce sharia and caliphate is based on the existence of the precepts of the One and Only God in Pancasila. So, this is the right of Muslims. Up to this point, it can be understood that HTI with its Khil fah accepts Pancasila but subtly places it under its ideological political structure, the Islamic caliphate.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> Sakrim Miharja, "Islam, Negara Dan Streotif Anti Pancasila," *KELOLA: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial* 1, no. 1 (2018).

<sup>27</sup> Hasbiyallah Hasbiyallah, and Moh. Sulhan, and Heri Khoiruddin, "Transformation of the Education of Moderate Muslim Society: A Thought Study of Nahdlatul Ulama," *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam* 6, no. 1 (2017): 25, <https://doi.org/10.14421/jpi.2017.61.25-50>.

<sup>28</sup> Abdullah bin Umar Sulaiman Ad-Dumaiji, *Al-Imamah Al- 'Uzhma 'Inda Ahl As -Sunnah Wa Al-Jama'Ah* (Saudi Arabia: Universitas Ummul Quro Makkah, 1983), 517.

<sup>29</sup> Syaiful Arif, "Kontradiksi Pandangan HTI Atas Pancasila," *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional* 2, no. 1 (2016).

## THE THOUGHT OF FIGURES OF ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATION ABOUT CALIPHATE: A CASE STUDY IN BANDA ACEH AND WEST JAVA

### Khil fah history and debate: Pros-Cons

Since the beginning, the Khil fah system had anomalies. Muhammad Abed Al-Jbir analyzed it into three aspects. First, there is no specific determination regarding the method which is promulgated in the selection of a caliph. Second, there is no limit to how long a caliph will serve. And third, there is no limitation on the caliph's authority. When there is a leader or caliphate vacuum, these three reasons divide Muslims, and the climax is when there is "big chaos," or al-fitnah al-kubra, a political chaos at the time when Uthman bin 'Affan's friend was killed, where the Sayyidina Ali and Muawiyah groups clashed to maintain their respective beliefs and truths.<sup>30</sup>

In contrast to Al-Jbir's concept, more explicitly, Abul A'la al-Maududi saw that the caliphate system actually existed in the Islamic system. Al-Maududi stated that the Khil fah is a form of government that requires state recognition of the leadership and the power of Allah and His Messenger in the field of legislation, surrendering all legislative power and the highest legal sovereignty to both of them and believes that his Caliphate represents the True Judge namely God. The powers in this position must be limited to the limits previously mentioned, legislative, judicial and executive.<sup>31</sup>

Scholars continue to dispute the relevance of the Islamic caliphate governing paradigm to modern politics to this day. Some Muslim academics argue that the concept of the caliphate is no longer relevant due to historical reasons; the caliphate is no longer compatible with democratic political modernisation. Others, on the other hand, believe that the concept of the caliphate is intertwined with current international political conditions, leading to the emergence of political movements calling for the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate in Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, and even Indonesia.<sup>32</sup> According to several other experts, the concept of khil fah, which was supported by several parties following the Arab Spring, had a difficult socio-political dilemma, requiring them to adapt Islamic principles to modern democratic values.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.lsaf.org>. Diakses, 07 Januari 2021.

<sup>31</sup> Abul A'la Al-Maududi, *Khil fah Dan Kerajaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1984), 63; Abul A'la Al-Maududi, *Hukum Dan Konstitusi; Sistem Politik Islam* (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), 169.

<sup>32</sup> Salman Sayyid and Bobby Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (Zed Books, 2003); Nazih Ayubi, "Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World" (Routledge, 2003).

<sup>33</sup> Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Stanford University Press, 2007); Noorhaidi Hasan, *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Muzayyin Ahyar, "Islamic Clicktivism: Internet, Democracy and Contemporary Islamist Activism in Surakarta," *Studia Islamika* 24, no. 3 (2017): 435–468.



Ahmad Fuadi Fanani, in his writing in Kompas (Saturday, February 26, 2005) stated that the Khil fah state government system is a form of a tyrannical constitutional system. This is based on two things. First, this system holds sovereignty in God's hands. Second, there is no Trias Political System. The absolute power possessed by the Caliph provided an opportunity for him to abuse the power he has. Hizbut Tahrir activist, Muhammad Ismail Yusanto responded to Ahmad Fuadi Fanani's opinion, stated that there was a mistake in Ahmad Fuadi Fanani's understanding. He explained that the caliph in the caliphate state system does not have absolute power because it is limited by the syara, so that in the implementation of his government the caliph is unlikely to abuse a power.<sup>34</sup>

Ahmadi H. Dardiri, in one of his writings, discussed the concept of the division of power in the Islamic state of the caliphate according to Hizb ut-Tahrir and its possible implementation in Indonesia.<sup>35</sup> HTI and moderate Islam have the same target, which is to make the state more active. However, the perspective on sharia and the state registration process of the two groups has led to pros and cons. If HTI views sharia in its legalistic and formalistic form in order to reconstruct the existing democratic state system with a new system in the form of an Islamic caliphate as an alternative to the failure of democracy, moderate Islamic groups see it in a substantial form. If HTI has the view that Islamic sharia is a state ideology with an Islamic caliphate, moderate Islam only wants to make sharia a code of ethics in a democratic country which will later give birth to what is called Theo-Democracy.<sup>36</sup>

The issue of caliphate in the history of Islam has resulted in differences opinions. Some say that the caliphate system came and originated from religious teachings, while others say the caliphate is a new system that has no roots from religious teachings. Thomas Arnold in this case said that the Khil fah was not based on an old political organization; in fact the Khil fah was a completely new organization, which emerged after the birth of Islam and after Arab power spread to Persia and most of the Eastern Roman Empire. The caliph is a political ruler and in his power gathers world power. His main duty in the field of religion does not exceed that of maintaining religion, as the protector of religion. The caliph has the right to

---

<sup>34</sup> Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, "Menjawab Kritikan Terhadap Konsep Khil fah," n.d., 6.

<sup>35</sup> Ahmadi H. Dardiri, "Konsepsi Pembagian Kekuasaan Negara Islam Khil fah Menurut Hizbut Tahrir Dan Kemungkinan Implementasinya Di Indonesia," *Millah* 16, no. 2 (2017).

<sup>36</sup> Hidayatussholihah, "Menuju Kesejahteraan Hidup Ikhtiar Memahami Khil fah Islamiyah Dan Teo-Demokrasi," *Islamic Review: Jurnal Riset Dan Kajian Keislaman* 6, no. 2 (2017): 169–194.

## THE THOUGHT OF FIGURES OF ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATION ABOUT CALIPHATE: A CASE STUDY IN BANDA ACEH AND WEST JAVA

declare war on the infidels, punish those who deviate from the religion, be the Imam of prayer and be a preacher during Friday prayers.<sup>37</sup>

Some of the previous literature above limits the object to the behavior of the Muslim community carrying the ideology of the caliphate in the context of history and its relationship with the modern state. On this note, in-depth study on the source of inspiration from the ideology of the caliphate which is understood and perceived by the figures of organizations in Indonesia is still missing. Therefore, through this field research with phenomenological approach, this article attempts to fill the void in this study by conducting research in two cities in Aceh and West Java.

### B. DISCUSSION

Different opinions about the establishment of the caliphate as explained in the previous section also occur in the Indonesian context, including within Islamic community organizations (Islamic organizations). Mass organizations in Bandung, West Java and Aceh as data sources in this study are Muhammadiyah Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), FUUI organizations (Forum 'Ulama Ummat Indonesia), The Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (LDII), and Al-Washliyyah Jabar.

Muhammadiyah is the largest religious organization in Indonesia that has long fought for values as well as forms of religious moderation through religious, socio-political, and cultural educational institutions. Muhammadiyah stands as the face of a modern socio-religious movement organization that has been able to adapt pure Islamic teachings to the real life of the modern world in Indonesia. The great ideas of renewing Islamic thought and education in Muhammadiyah circles were generally inspired and encouraged by Muhammad Abduh's thought reform movement in Egypt.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, Muhammadiyah organizations in Bandung and Aceh reject the enforcement of the caliphate that could threaten the life aspects of Indonesian society.<sup>39</sup>

NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) has a firm view regarding the caliphate system, namely rejecting its existence. The historical record of NU's rejection of the caliphate system was

---

<sup>37</sup> M. (2017). Mukhtar, "Ali Hasjmy Dan Konsep Kekuasaan Dalam Islam," *Al-Ijtimai: International Journal of Government and Social Science* 3, no. 1 (2017): 55–70.

<sup>38</sup> Alwi Shihab, *Membendung Arus: Respons Gerakan Muhammadiyah Terhadap Penetrasi Misi Kristen Di Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 1998), 86.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with Dr.H. Aslam Nur MA di Aceh 11 Januari 2020. Interview with H Suhada wakil Ketua PW Muhammadiyah Jawa Barat 11 February 2020.

seen at the 1930 NU Congress in Banjarmasin.<sup>40</sup> Based on these historical data and facts, NU does not want an Islamic state, thus fighting against the enforcement of the caliphate system in Indonesia.

PWNU Bandung and Aceh believe the government to take serious legal action to dissolve Ormas that are suspected of spreading anti-Pancasila ideology or attempting to replace the Pancasila state's foundation. The government must take this bold move exclusively to protect and defend the Indonesian nation's integrity, unity, and unity based on an understanding that is opposed to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In this circumstance, PWNU Bandung also supports the government with Perppu No. With the emergence of CSOs that openly subscribe to and develop an ideology that is illegal in Indonesia based on Perppu No.2 of 2017, the threat to the nation's integrity is already visible.<sup>41</sup>

This Islamic mass organization group in Indonesia voices the discourse on the enforcement of the caliphate massively.<sup>42</sup> History has noted that the HTI movement has also colored the political map in Indonesia where the main struggle is to formalize religion and politics in a single narrative, namely Islam. Therefore, in HTI belief, the caliphate system must be upheld.<sup>43</sup> Thus, HTI falls into the romanticism of past history that longs for the glory of Islam as it was achieved during the time of al-khulafa 'al-Rasyidin and the reign of ' Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 720 AD).<sup>44</sup>

HTI's understanding of the caliphate is based on two key Islamic sources: the Qur'an and hadith.<sup>45</sup> This regulation means that the Muslim ummah returns to live Islamically under the auspices of al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah where all activities of life are determined by Islamic Shari'ah and it becomes an obligation for its followers to spread the message of the caliphate to the world by two ways in the form of da'wah and jihad.<sup>46</sup> In the end, HTI has consecrated

---

<sup>40</sup> Said Agil Siradj, "NU, Aswaja, dan Visi Kebangsaan", in Zudi Setiawan, *Nasionalisme NU* (Semarang: Aneka Ilmu, 2007), 2.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with KH. Tajudin Subkhi selaku Rais Syuriah PCNU Kota Bandung 11 February 2020. Interview with Teungku Nuruzzahri 11 Januari 2020.

<sup>42</sup> HTI memiliki kantor di hampir seluruh wilayah di Indonesia. Pada tahun 2001 dan 2007 HTI mampu menghadirkan puluhan ribu massa dari berbagai daerah di Jakarta. Bahkan, pertengahan tahun 2009, HTI berhasil menggelar Musyawarah Ulama Nasional (MUN) yang mengumpulkan sekitar 6000 tokoh Muslim dari seluruh Indonesia di gedung tennis indoor Senayan. Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, "Between Revolution and Reform: The Future of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 2, no. 2 (2009): 69–85, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467580902822163>.

<sup>43</sup> Mohamad Rafiuddin, "MENGENAL HIZBUT TAHRIR (Studi Analisis Ideologi Hizbut Tahrir Visi a Visi NU)," *Islamuna: Jurnal Studi Islam* 2, no. 1 (2015): 29, <https://doi.org/10.19105/islamuna.v2i1.653>.

<sup>44</sup> Nadirsyah Hosen, *Islam Yes, Khil fah No!: Doktrin Dan Sejarah Politik Islam Dari Khulafa Ar-Rasyidin Hingga Umayyah* (Yogyakarta: Suka Press, 2018).

<sup>45</sup> Hizb. Al-Tahrir, "Manhaj Hizb Al-Tahrir Fi Al-Taghyir" (Beirut, 2009).

<sup>46</sup> Dasar HTI ini sesuai dengan dasar HT pusat. Taqiyudin An-Nabhani, *Daulah Islam* (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2012), 11–13; Tim Hizbut Tahrir, *Struktur Negara Khil fah (Pemerintahan Dan Administrasi)*, Terj. Yahya. A.R, (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2008), 14.

## THE THOUGHT OF FIGURES OF ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATION ABOUT CALIPHATE: A CASE STUDY IN BANDA ACEH AND WEST JAVA

itself as a political movement (السياسة الحركية), which has fikrah and tariqah (epistemological) so that all its thoughts, movements and orientations are political.

The genre of the HTI political movement is a form of anti-democratic political movement and carries the ideals of upholding Islamic law and life within the framework of the Islamic Shari'ah system with sovereignty in God's hands, which Bassam Tibi characterized as Islamic Political Movement.<sup>47</sup> Burhanuddin Muhtadi sees that amid the trend of a number of Islamic social movements that emerged post-New Order regime, HTI has a typical uniqueness that assumes the Islamic caliphate system of government can guarantee the formalization and application of Islamic law in the country.<sup>48</sup> Meanwhile, HTI's dichotomous reading — Islamic and non-Islamic — of reality, as well as its textual thinking on religious doctrine, was assessed by Ibrahim Abu Bakar as a certain level of religious fundamentalism.<sup>49</sup>

Other Islamic organizations with a purpose to enforcing Islamic law and the caliphate in West Java and Aceh include the Islamic Defenders Front, a mass movement (FPI). According to the FPI's pamphlets and lines of battle, the organization's goal is to do amar makruf nahi munkar, or to aid the government in eradicating social ills including prostitution, gambling, and alcohol and drug transactions. Azyumardi Azra saw that after the leadership of the new order ended, there was a new phenomenon of the *amr ma'r f nahy munkar* movement as part of the hardline or radical Islamic movement. The impression of the hard line can be seen at first from the names and terminology they use. There are factions that go by nicknames like Jundullah (Army of Allah), Laskar jihad, and Hezbollah, as well as larger organizations like the Islamic Defenders Front.<sup>50</sup> If FPI is linked to Indonesia's radical Islamic movement, it is one example of an organization that might be classified as a radical Islamic movement.<sup>51</sup>

Although radicals were pinned on the FPI, the rejection came from the followers and figures of the FPI themselves. For example, Abdul Qohar Nurjaman al-Qodysi as the chairman of Tanfidzi DPD FPI West Java who said that the efforts of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar and the enforcement of Islamic law is not radical but an obligation for every Muslim.

---

<sup>47</sup> Bassam Tibi, *Ancaman Fundamentalisme: Rajutan Islam Politik Dan Kekacauan Dunia Baru*, ed. Zainul Abbas dan Shinta Carolina Imron Rosyidi (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2000).

<sup>48</sup> Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "The Quest for Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 37, no. 4 (2009): 623–45, <https://doi.org/10.1163/156853109X460219>.

<sup>49</sup> Ibrahim Abu Bakar, "Fundamentalisme Islam: Istilah Yang Dapat Menyesatkan," *Ulumul Qur'an* 4, no. 3 (1993).

<sup>50</sup> Azyumardi Azra, *Muslim Indonesia: Viabilitas "Garis Keras"* (Jakarta: Gatra, 2000).

<sup>51</sup> Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi, *Islam Dan Radikalisme Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005).

FPI has been doing its share appropriately on the basis of the authentic 1945 Constitution and the original Pancasila, namely the Jakarta Charter of July 22, 1945, the first article.<sup>52</sup>

According to the FPI, al-caliphate ala Manhaj al-Nubuwwah is the notion of caliphate with the advent of a figure of Imam Mahdi al-Muntadhar version of Ahlussunnah wa al-Jama'ah based on the Qur'an and Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad saw. Abdul Qohar said, "There will be a time when the figure of Imam Mahdi al-Muntadhar named Sayyid Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Fatimi al-Hasani as the caliph who was sworn in by 313 Muslim leaders from all over the world in front of the Kaaba and every Muslim must obey and submit to it, otherwise every Muslim is an apostate and obliged to fight".<sup>53</sup>

While waiting for Imam Mahdi to arrive, FPI recognizes the caliphate as a reality today, both at the national and international levels. First, at the national level, the FPI calls on Muslims to uphold Islamic Shari'ah in the context of the 1945 Constitution's authentic constitutional foundation, which is based on the Jakarta Charter of July 22, 1945, which is Divinity with the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari'ah for its adherents. Thus, in West Java, Sharia regulations have been established in almost 27 city districts. Second, at the Global International level, FPI proposes Islamic states to: 1). create a common currency among all Muslims around the world. 2). Establish territorial lines in Muslim countries do not have to use visas. 3). create a common parliament for the Muslim countries of the world, and 4). Propose the existence of military unity in Muslim countries around the world.<sup>54</sup>

At the international global level, according to Abdul Qohar, in fact the caliphate system has long been practiced by European countries with the union of currencies in the form of Euros and military unity under NATO's auspices. On this note, Abdul Qohar said: "Why is the caliphate system not implemented in Islamic countries? Because there is a divisive agenda carried out by the West with its orientalism so that secular, pluralist notions emerge to essentially keep the Muslim ummah from the emergence of enforcing the caliphate system in an Islamic country".<sup>55</sup>

FPI's da'wah according to Habib Idrus Al-Habsy is preaching carried out by first going directly to the community, second conveying knowledge, data and argument so that it is not just unfounded rhetoric, and third by keeping preaching anywhere and anytime.<sup>56</sup> According to the FPI, the goal of the Khilafah is to struggle for the construction of a caliphate ala Manhaj

---

<sup>52</sup>Interview with Abdul Qohar Nurjaman al-Qodsyi selaku ketua Tanfidzi DPD FPI Jawa Barat, 11 February 2020 di kediamannya Jatinangor Sumedang Jawa Barat.

<sup>53</sup> Interview with Abdul Qohar Nurjaman al-Qodsyi

<sup>54</sup> Interview with Abdul Qohar Nurjaman al-Qodsyi

<sup>55</sup> Interview with Abdul Qohar Nurjaman al-Qodsyi

<sup>56</sup> Interview with Habib Idrus Al-Habsy, 12 February 2020.

## THE THOUGHT OF FIGURES OF ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATION ABOUT CALIPHATE: A CASE STUDY IN BANDA ACEH AND WEST JAVA

an-nubuwah without having to remove identities in Muslim countries, rather than to establish an Islamic State like the HTI mass organizations. While Indonesia adheres to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the system must be submissive to an elected Caliph named Sayyid Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Fatimi al-Hasani.<sup>57</sup>

The next Islamic organization in Bandung is the FUUI (Forum 'Ulama Ummat Indonesia). In this case, FUUI does not agree with the efforts of some radical Islamic groups who are struggling to establish an Islamic State. When asked about this issue, Hilman stated, "I am not as extreme as Hizbuttahrir (establishing the Islamic Khil fah). In my opinion, if you want to make a coconut plantation, what you need to do is plant as many coconut trees as possible and take care of them. "There is no need to label "this is a coconut plantation", then God willing, people will call it a coconut garden. Likewise if you want to make a pineapple garden, then plant as many pineapple trees as possible and take care of them so that there are no other trees that interfere with the pineapples. People will definitely call our garden a pineapple garden, without having to give the brand or label "Pineapple Plantation". Let us invite the public to want to carry out Islamic teachings well, in the future the community will need Islamic Shari'ah by itself, so there is no need to replace Pancasila or the 45 Constitution."<sup>58</sup>

This is the concept of khil fah according to FUUI, which emphasizes Islamic values, not on the change or establishment of an Islamic State, because there is no qhot'i argument to explain it. In this case, Atian Ali said: "There is no qoth'i argument coming from the Quran and the Prophet's Hadith which states that there must be enforcement of the caliphate system. The principle does not change; only the form changes. It does not have to be an Islamic state but a system that is in accordance with Islamic values. Uniting Muslims throughout the world under the auspices of the Caliph is something that is still far from human reasoning, because it only unites Muslims throughout the city of Bandung".<sup>59</sup>

Thus, in the view of FUUI, practicing the substance of Islam is far more important than the formalization of Islamic teachings. The views of FUUI above are shared by LDII Islamic organizations. In LDDI's view, the Indonesian Muslim ummah does not need to establish an Islamic state. The most crucial aspect is to struggle for the incorporation of

---

<sup>57</sup> Interview with Abdul Qohar Nurjaman al-Qodysi dan Nawawi selaku Ketua FPI Kota Bandung 10 February 2020 di Gedebage Kota Bandung.

<sup>58</sup> Interview with Hilman Sekjen FUUI Bandung.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with Atian Ali FUUI Bandung, 13 February 2020.

Islamic teachings' principles into the government structure, which is already governed by Islamic Shari'a laws.<sup>60</sup>

The same concept comes from the Islamic organization Al-Washliyyah in Bandung by choosing the middle path. Regarding the issue of the caliphate, there are two major groups. First, the caliphate system has a religious basis. The second caliphate has no basis in the teachings of Islam. So for al-Washliyyah prefers the middle way, namely Islamic values that must be fought for in this country.<sup>61</sup> The advantages and disadvantages of the caliphate are more about "understanding," and it is apparent that this country has reached a conclusion with the Unitary Republic of Indonesia Pancasila and Bhinika Tunggal Ika, which cannot and will not be changed.<sup>62</sup> Meanwhile, Al Washliyah of the city of Banda Aceh has the view that the intention to establish a caliphate either individually or in a group of people or organizations is legitimate and humane, given that historically that the caliphate has been successful for about 13 centuries and Muslims have reached the culmination point of glory at that time. When the Ottoman Caliphate ended on March 3, 1924, the condition of Muslims in many countries became worse, both in terms of economically and politically, and culturally. However, in the context of Indonesia, this caliphate can be implemented in the form of practicing Islamic values at every level of life.<sup>63</sup>

Regardless of the pros and cons, what is clear is that the ideology of the caliphate is part of the face of the new conservatism. The two main Islamic conservative groups in Indonesia take different paths: one group with violence that breeds terrorism, such as JI,<sup>64</sup> another group active in the public sphere with caliphate campaigns, such as HTI. There is also other conservatism (although it does not support the caliphate program), but strives for an agenda of Sharia and Islamism (such as PKS / Prosperous Justice Party and FPI) in Pancasila democracy by adhering to democratic procedures.<sup>65</sup> FPI is also part of a mass organization that intimidates the public with sweeping movements and often takes to the streets with large crowds.<sup>66</sup> It should be noted that, openly, not all conservative and radical groups offer a caliphate system, but secretly they participate in fighting for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.

---

<sup>60</sup> Interview with Dwi (LDII Bandung) at PP. Miftahunnur Cimahi Bandung, 17 February 2020.

<sup>61</sup> Interview with Karsidi Diningrat (Al-Washliyyah of West Java), 14 February 2020.

<sup>62</sup> Interview with Ahamd Aidin selaku (Al-Washliyyah of West Java), 14 February 2020.

<sup>63</sup> Interview with Achyar (Al-Washliyyah Aceh), 15 April 2020.

<sup>64</sup> Z. Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (Routledge, 2006).

<sup>65</sup> Ahmad Norma Permata, "Ideology, Institutions, Political Actions: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia," *Asien*, 2008, 22–36.

<sup>66</sup> Woodward M et Al., "The Islamic Defenders Front: Demonization, Violence and the State in Indonesia," *Implementation Science* 39, no. 1 (2014): 1–24.

## THE THOUGHT OF FIGURES OF ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATION ABOUT CALIPHATE: A CASE STUDY IN BANDA ACEH AND WEST JAVA

### C. CONCLUSION

Research on the caliphate in the perspective of Islamic mass organizations in Bandung, West Java and Banda Aceh was carried out comprehensively with in-depth interviews with Islamic mass organization figures. From some of the figures' thoughts, each of them has a different basis for thinking, both for and against. In terms of thought, there are those that are totally doctrinal in nature. Some are commando in other words, following instructions and directions from their leadership figures in implementing their agenda.

During field research, three main trends were found in Islamic mass organizations in Aceh and West Java in understanding the concept of the caliphate. First, textualist-functionalists, they are mass organizations that see the Islamic caliphate as mandatory, without having to change the ideology or identity of a country. Second, Contextualist-Substantive. This organization of the view that the *Khilafah* is a value and essentially does not conflict with the state ideology Pancasila. Third, ideological-political. Organizations that think that fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state, or the *Daulah Islamiyyah Khilafah*, is a need and even an obligation.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abu Bakar, Ibrahim. "Fundamentalisme Islam: Istilah Yang Dapat Menyesatkan." *Ulumul Qur'an* 4, no. 3 (1993).
- Abuza, Z. *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*. Routledge, 2006.
- Ad-Dumaiji, 'Abdu All h bin 'Umar Sulaym n. *Al-Im mah Al-'Uzhm 'Ind Ahl al-Sunnah Wa al-Jama'ah*. Saudi Arabia: Ummul Qura Makkah, 1983.
- Ahnaf, Mohammad Iqbal. "Between Revolution and Reform: The Future of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 2, no. 2 (2009): 69–85. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467580902822163>.
- Ahyar, Muzayyin. "Aksi Bela Islam : Islamic Clicktivism and the New Authority of Religious Propaganda in the Millennial Age in Indonesia" 9, no. 1 (2019): 1–29.
- . "Islamic Clicktivism: Internet, Democracy and Contemporary Islamist Activism in Surakarta." *Studia Islamika* 24, no. 3 (2017): 435–468.
- Al-Asfah n , Al-R ghib. *Mu'jam Mufrad t Li al-F z Al-Qur' n*. Cairo: Mu afa al-B b al-Halabi, 1961.
- Al-Maududi. *Al-Isl m Wa al-Madaniyyah al- ad tsah*. Edited by Asep Hikmat. al-Q hirah: D r al-An r, 1978.
- Al-Maududi, Abul A'la. *Hukum Dan Konstitusi; Sistem Politik Islam*. Bandung: Mizan, 1995.
- . *Khilafah Dan Kerajaan*. Bandung: Mizan, 1984.
- Al-Mawardi. *Al-A k m Al-Sul niyyah Wa Al-Wil y t Al-D niyyah*. Beirut: D r al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2011.
- Al-Suy , Jal l al-D n. *T rikh Al-Khulaf 'l*. Beirut: D r al-Thaqafa, 1988.
- Al-Ta r r , izb. "Manhaj izb Al-Ta r r F Al-Taghy r." Beirut, 2009.
- Al., Woodward M et. "The Islamic Defenders Front: Demonization, Violence and the State in Indonesia." *Implementation Science* 39, no. 1 (2014): 1–24.



- Alwi Shihab. *Membendung Arus: Respons Gerakan Muhammadiyah Terhadap Penetrasi Misi Kristen Di Indonesia*. Bandung: Mizan, 1998.
- Amin, Ainur Rofiq Al. "Konstruksi Sistem Khilafah Hizbut Tahrir." *Review Politik* 07 (2017).
- An-Nabhani. *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir (Terj)*. Jakarta: HTI Press, n.d.
- An-Nabhani, Taqiyudin. *Daulah Islam*. Jakarta: HTI Press, 2012.
- Arif, Syaiful. "Kontradiksi Pandangan HTI Atas Pancasila." *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional* 2, no. 1 (2016).
- At- abar , Mu ammad Ibn Jar r. *J mi' Al-Bay n 'an Ta'w l yi Al-Qur' n*. Beirut: D r al-Fikr, 1984.
- Ayubi, Nazih. "Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World." Routledge, 2003.
- Azra, Azyumardi. *Muslim Indonesia: Viabilitas "Garis Keras"*. Jakarta: Gatra, 2000.
- . "Relevansi Khilafah Di Indonesia." *Kompas*, 2007.
- Azra, Azyumardi, Noorhaidi Hasan, Yusdani, Zuly Qodir, Alimatul Qibtyah, Nur Kholis, Krismono, Supriyanto Abdi, Ahmad Sadzali, and Hadza Min Fadhli Robby. *Islam Indonesia 2020*. Yogyakarta: UII Press, 2020.
- Bayat, Asef. *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. Stanford University Press, 2007.
- Bernad Lewis. *The Political Language of Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1988.
- Dardiri, Ahmadi H. "Konsepsi Pembagian Kekuasaan Negara Islam Khilafah Menurut Hizbut Tahrir Dan Kemungkinan Implementasinya Di Indonesia." *Millah* 16, no. 2 (2017).
- Erlina, Fatni. "Sistem Khilafah Islamiyah Dalam Perspektif Ketatanegaraan Republik Indonesia." *Jurnal Idea Hukum* 5, no. 1 (2019): 2019.
- Faidi, Ahmad. "Sistem Kekhalifahan Dan Konstruksi Budaya Politik Arab." *Al-Ihkam* 13, no. 1 (2018).
- Firdaus, Muhammad. "Konstruksi Makna Ideologi Hizbut Tahrir; Studi Fenomenologi Tentang Makna Ideologi Khilafah Dan Politik Aktivistis Hizbut Tahrir Di Pekanbaru." *Jurnal ILMU KOMUNIKASI* 8, no. 1 (2017): 47–62.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi. *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Hasbiyallah, Hasbiyallah, and Moh. Sulhan, and Heri Khoiruddin. "Transformation of the Education of Moderate Muslim Society: A Thought Study of Nahdlatul Ulama." *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam* 6, no. 1 (2017): 25. <https://doi.org/10.14421/jpi.2017.61.25-50>.
- Hidayatussholihah. "Menuju Kesejahteraan Hidup Ikhtiar Memahami Khilafah Islamiyah Dan Teo-Demokrasi." *Islamic Review: Jurnal Riset Dan Kajian Keislaman* 6, no. 2 (2017): 169–94.
- Hosen, Nadirsyah. *Islam Yes, Khilafah No!: Doktrin Dan Sejarah Politik Islam Dari Khulafa Ar-Rasyidin Hingga Umayyah*. Yogyakarta: Suka Press, 2018.
- Idil Akbar. "Khilafah Islamiyah: Antara Konsep Dan Realitas Kenegaraan; Republik Islam Iran Dan Kerajaan Islam Arab Saudi." *Journal of Government and Civil Society* 1, no. 1 (2017): 95–109. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004>.
- Jiwandana, Ahmad Subekti. "Antara Khilafah Dan Pancasila; Sebuah Jawaban Terhadap Anggapan Khilafah Anti Pancasila." *Kalimah: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama Dan Pemikiran Islam* 16, no. 1 (2018): 35–50.
- Khaldun, Ibn. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History-Abridged Edition*. Princeton University Press, 2015.
- Man r, Ibn. *Lis n Al-'Arab*. Beirut: D r Sadhr, 1968.
- Miharja, Sakrim. "Islam, Negara Dan Streotif Anti Pancasila." *KELOLA: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial* 1, no. 1 (2018).
- Muhammad Ismail Yusanto. "Menjawab Kritikan Terhadap Konsep Khilafah," n.d.

**THE THOUGHT OF FIGURES OF ISLAMIC MASS ORGANIZATION ABOUT  
CALIPHATE: A CASE STUDY IN BANDA ACEH AND WEST JAVA**

- Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. "The Quest for Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia." *Asian Journal of Social Science* 37, no. 4 (2009): 623–45. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156853109X460219>.
- Mukhtar, M. (2017). "Ali Hasjmy Dan Konsep Kekuasaan Dalam Islam." *Al-Ijtimai: International Journal of Government and Social Science* 3, no. 1 (2017): 55–70.
- Permata, Ahmad Norma. "Ideology, Institutions, Political Actions: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia." *Asien*, 2008, 22–36.
- Rafiuddin, Mohamad. "MENGENAL HIZBUT TAHRIR (Studi Analisis Ideologi Hizbut Tahrir Vis a Vis NU)." *Islamuna: Jurnal Studi Islam* 2, no. 1 (2015): 29. <https://doi.org/10.19105/islamuna.v2i1.653>.
- Raziq, Ali Abdul. *Khil fah Dan Pemerintahan Dalam Islam*, Terj. Afif Muhammad. Bandung: Pustaka, 1985.
- Rido Putra. "Konsep Negara Ideal Ali Abdul Raziq Dan Relevansinya Dengan Pancasila." *Indonesian Journal of Islami Theology and Philosophy* 1, no. 1 (2019): 45–62. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.126.1.78>.
- Salman Sayyid, and Bobby Sayyid. *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*. Zed Books, 2003.
- Setiawan, Zudi. *Nasionalisme NU*. Semarang: Aneka Ilmu, 2007.
- Shiddiqi, Nourouzzaman. *Jeram-Jeram Peradaban Muslim*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1996.
- Siregar, Syahrudin. "Islam Dalam Perspektif Sejarah Pemikiran Ali Abdul Raziq." *JUSPI: Jurnal Sejarah Peradaban Islam* 2, no. 1 (2018): 124–37.
- T.W. Arnold "Khalifa" dalam M.TH. Houstma. *First Encyclopedia of Islam*. IV. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987.
- Taymiyyah, Ibn. *Minhaj Al-Sunnah Al-Nabawiyah Fi Naqd Kalam Al-Syi'ah Wa Al-Qadariyyah*. Makkah: Dar al-Baz, n.d.
- Tibi, Bassam. *Ancaman Fundamentalisme: Rajutan Islam Politik Dan Kekacauan Dunia Baru*. Edited by Zainul Abbas dan Shinta Carolina Imron Rosyidi. Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2000.
- Tim. *Ensiklopedi Indonesia*. III. Jakarta: Ichiar baru Van Hoeve, 1982.
- Tim Hizbut Tahrir. *Struktur Negara Khil fah (Pemerintahan Dan Administrasi)*, Terj. Yahya. A.R. Jakarta: HTI Press, 2008.
- Turmudi, Endang, and Riza Sihbudi. *Islam Dan Radikalisme Di Indonesia*. Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005.