Progressiveness of Islamic Economic Law in Indonesia: The

: Islamic economic law is unresponsive and tends to be legal-formal in supervising Sharia finance and economic development. Economics, in fact, emphasizes the aspects of flexibility and convenience. This study aims to reveal the response of fatwas to economic and financial developments using the murā‘at al-‘ilal wa al-maṣāliḥ approach. The study use qualitative research method. The study used qualitative research methods, analyzed using the proposed fiqh and fiqh approaches. The data studied is the fatwa of the National Sharia Council ( Dewan Syariah Nasional /DSN) of the Indonesian Ulema Council ( Majelis Ulama Indonesia /MUI). This fatwa is examined by comparing chronologically the time, the opinion of the clergy, and economic developments. The three fatwas became the focus and debate of scholars examined to find patterns in responding to the needs of financial and economic transactions. As a result, fatwas are dynamic and responsive to industry needs. The law can change since the legal reasons ( ‘illat ) behind it also changes. The existence of a law lies in how the cause of the law works; hence, in fatwa, there are things changing and some are permanent legal provisions. This finding has implications for corrections to previous legal provisions and changes to contracts made between financial institutions and clients.


Introduction
The Fatwa (Islamic Instructions of rules) of DSN-MUI (National Sharia Council-Indonesian Ulema Council) has become the sharia standard for financial, business and economic activities with an aim to ascertain the implementation of sharia compliance. The implementation of sharia principles has been increasingly widespread in many financial, business and economic sectors such in hospitals, crypto, electronic money, financial technology, or hotels. There are various methods available to answer the complexity of the business sectors, for instance, by legalizing the use of a combination of contracts, either in the form of multi-contract ('uqud mujtami'ah) or plural contract ('uqud muta'addidah), 1 the transformation of ijārah from fiqh to banking, which was originally dzanni to be binding, 2 using the promise in the with the existing sharia contracts more. It should have an ability to create innovations to answer the needs of economic development to make their roles for economic progress and people's welfare getting tangible. 9 On the other hand, in fatwa, the aspects of economic values have no adequate portion in sharia standards in banking 10 and the values of bank and social responsibilities tend to be ignored. 11 Islamic bank has three responsibilities to the God, mankind, and environment. 12 As a consequence, the practices of riba (interest) can still be found in Islamic banking as seen in the practice of bay' al-'inah and tawarruq. 13 The contract of bay' al-'inah still becomes a matter of debate among the sharia supervisory boards. The application of the contract is not similar with the one in LKS. 14 The contextualization of the prohibition of riba is required in order to make the principle of social solidarity more prioritized. 15 The use of bay' and salaf (qarḍ) contracts in savings has emerged the potential for riba if the two contracts are interdependent. An alternative to this contract is by using qarḍ, which is not business-oriented and does not provide any profit sharing for the customers. Tawarruq contract is also another alternative, allowing the customers to have benefit. 16 The gap between the role and tendency of the formal legality of the fatwa raises the question of how Islamic jurists and muftis combine legal provisions and the growth of economic. To respond to these criticisms, a fatwa method has 9 Mohamad Akram Laldin and Hafas Furqani, "Innovation Versus Replication Some Notes on the Approaches in Defining Shariah Compliance in Islamic Finance", Al-Jāmi'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 54, no. 2 (2016), p. 249-272. 10 Zulkifli bin Hasan, "From legalism to value-oriented Islamic finance practices", Humanomics 2, No. 4, (2016), p. 437-458. 11 Saeed Mohammed Akhtar Ali and F. Mansor , "Value-based Islamic banking and reporting in Bahrain", International Journal of Ethics and Systems 37 No. 4, (2021), pp. 644-663. 12 Asep Syarifuddin Hidayat, et.all., "Legal Obligations of Social Responsibility as Efforts to Improve the Image of Islamic Banking in Indonesia", Samarah: Hukum Keluarga dan Hukum Islam 6, No. 2 (2022), p.775. 13 Fathullah Al Haq Muhamad Asni and Jasni Sulong, "The Model of Istinbat by the Sharia Advisory Council of Central Bank of Malaysia", International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 8, No. 1 (2018), p. 12-23. 14 Fathullah al-Haq Muhamad Asni, "Management of fatwa standardisation on the practice of bay' 'inah contract in Malaysia: an analysis according to usul al-Fiqh and mura'aht al- Khilaf method", Qualitative Research in Financial Markets 13, No. 1, (2021), p. 118-139. 15 Servet Bayindir and Murat Ustaoglu, "The issue of interest (riba) in the Abrahamic religions", International Journal of Ethics and Systems 34 No. 3, (2018), p. 282-303. 16 Mahadi Ahmad and Riaz Ansary, "Fiqhī views on bayʿwa salaf and qard-based Islamic banking deposit accounts in Malaysia", ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance 9, No. 1, 2017 pp. 106-112. been developed by considering the aspects of legal philosophy and benefits. Benefit as the goal of religion should be integrated into sharia banking. 17 This is the focus of this research that has not been discussed by previous researchers. Fatwas can entirely be a driving force for the implementation of benefit, for both micro and macro aspects in sharia financial activities. 18 The targeted benefit should consider the collective benefit that can be realized by providing financing to the real and businesses sector and by reducing financing that only provides personal benefits such as consumptive murābaha financing. 19 The benefit considerations are structured through the ijtihad murā'at al-'ilal wa al-maṣāliḥ approach. This paper is to explain a number of DSN-MUI fatwas by using the murā'at al-'ilal wa al-maṣāliḥ approach with a focus on three fatwas that have been issued, i.e. wa'd or muwā'adah mulzimah, compensation for guarantee services (kafālah bi al-ujrah or kafālah bi al-ju'l), and non-cash buying and selling of gold by considering that these three topics are the DSN-MUI fatwa many Islamic law experts are discussing most.
The study used qualitative research methods, analyzed using the proposed fiqh and fiqh approaches. 20 The data studied is the fatwa of the National Sharia Council (Dewan Syariah Nasional/DSN) of the Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI). This fatwa is examined by comparing chronologically the time, the opinion of the clergy, and economic developments in Indonesia.

Murā'at al-'Ilal wa al-Maṣāliḥ Approach
In the realm of fiqh, finance and economics are categorized as the muamalah activities. The main principle of understanding religious texts related to muamalah activities is acceptability and benefit. Principally, evary muamalah activity is allowed as long as there is no any restrictions governing it. The muamalah activities purposely is to realize the widest possible goodness, welfare and benefit for mankind. Two approaches can be used to understand the Progressiveness of Islamic Economic Law Hasanuddin, et.al. DOI: 10.22373/sjhk.v7i2.17601 http://jurnal.ar-raniry.ac.id/index.php/samarah 1272 mu'āmalah texts, i.e. textual approach (ta'ābbudi) and logic to understand the meaning of a text (ta'āqquli). 21 The ta'ābudi (textualist) approach is an approach using the linguistic meanings of the texts of the Qur'an and the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH as the sources of truth without a need to deeply know the intent or purpose as the reason ('illat) of the existence of the laws contained in these texts. The hadith of the Prophet Muhammad about the prohibition to combine the bai'contract with qarḍ (nahā Rasulullah SAW 'an bai' wa salaf), for instance, is interpreted by this approach as harām (unlawful act) and there is no attempt to understand the reason why such combination is forbidden. In contrast, the ta'aqquli approach places the causes of the existence of the texts of Al-Qur'an and hadith as both the source of truth and the basis for determining a law. In the example of the hadith above, the prohibition of combining the contract of bai' with qarḍ is because there is a cause of 'illat riba (cause) and/or hilah ribawiyah. For this, the combination of the contract is permissible if not causing riba and/or hilah ribawiyah.
The ta'āquli approach applies the principle of considering causes and benefits (murā'at al-'ilal wa al-maṣāliḥ ), meaning that the cause and understandable as cause or its legal essence ('illat). The aim of mu'āmalah activities is to reach benefit (obtaining benefits and eliminating harm [ . 23 For this, mu'āmalah applies the rule that "the implementation of legal provisions is in line with the 'illat, if there is 'illat, then the law is valid; while when there is no 'illat, then the legal ). 24 The implementation of these rules, for instance, include; first, the goods price determination by the state (tas'ir). by Imam al-Tirmidhi (3: 606) mentions the rejection of the Prophet's to set the prices when there was a price fluctuation of goods. 25 Through the approach of understanding meaning, Ibn Rif 'ah al-Syafi'i, the Ulama of Malikiyah and Hanafiah interpreted it not as an absolute prohibition. Price determination is accepted in a state of ḍarurah/hajah to prevent any public harm. The legal 'Illat of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH related to the unwillingness for the price control is because of business injustice (ẓhulm al-tujjār), while Ibn Rif'ah allowed it to prevent business injustice so that the State was allowed to control prices. 26 Kamil Shakr al-Qaisi stated that: a) price control is not original law (but it is done due to emergency reasons); b) the original law of price determination in business is voluntary (not under any coercion); and c) price determination is the authority of the contracting parties and may not exceed the limit by limiting the price (and profit). 27 Sheikh Ahmad Ibn Sheikh Muhammad al-Zarqa stated that price control is legitimate only in emergency states (yutahamal al-ḍarar al-khashsh li daf' al-ḍarar al-'amm). 28 Hence, the Ulama of Hanafiah in Majallat al-Ahkām al-'Adliyyah allow the price control by limiting the profit that the seller is entitled to receive. 29 Imam Malik viewed that the maximum amount of profit that the seller deserves is one-third of the acquisition price or production price. 30 Another thing is related to the prohibition of buying and selling garar (the mabi' is not available under the contract), but some allow the contract of bai' alsalam and bai' al-istishna' because the mabi' allows it to be handed over in future. 31 The Prophet forbade buying and selling fish in water (bai' al-samak fi al-ma'), but Ibn Qumadah al-Maqdisi allowed buying and selling fish in ponds as long as the fish are seen (mari'an) and can be caught for handover (al-qudrah 'ala al-taslim). 32 Buying and selling with down payment (first payment) for the commitment to buy goods, which is a deduction from the total price to be paid at the agreed time ('urbun) is forbidden, but this is done. The down payment becomes the right of the prospective seller if the sale is not carried out. The prohibition of buying and selling is because the down payment has become a part of the price, so when a sale is void, there is no price (tsaman). For this, the down payment belongs to the prospective buyer which must be returned. Ulama viewed that down payment as a commitment to purchase is acceptable provided that the down payment must be returned to the prospective buyer when the buying and selling contract is not carried out. 33 These examples prove that the considerations of legal reasons and benefit have determined the understanding of the texts of the Qur'an or hadis. The purpose of every prohibition or order can be explored so that the legal provisions can be set aside if the causes and objectives are not fulfilled. Such method is applied in formulating the fatwa of DSN to respond to Islamic economic and financial developments. The examination of this method in a number of DSN fatwas is presented as follows.

The Implementation of Murā'at al-'Ilal wa al-Maṣāliḥ Muwa'adah and Wa'd Mulzim Concept
Promise (wa'd) means a statement of the will of a certain party to do something good (or not do bad deed) in the future. A promise consists of three important elements: a statement from the party to do or not to do an act, the action to be done in future, and the promised action as a good deed. A person who promises states that he or she will do a certain good in future. If two people make a promise, it is then called as muwa'adah (mutual promise).
Ulama have different thoughts about the obligation to fulfill promises. Some stated that the law of fulfilling promises is sunnah, while other ulama stated that it is binding. Mahmud said that this obligation, according to Fahd Ahmad al-Amuri, is divided into two situations: the obligation to fulfill Progressiveness of Islamic Economic Law Hasanuddin, et.al. DOI: 10.22373/sjhk.v7i2.17601 http://jurnal.ar-raniry.ac.id/index.php/samarah 1275 promises whatever form and the obligation to fulfill promises dependent upon certain conditions (mu'allaq). 34 Wahbah al-Zuhaili explained the opinions of the Ulama of Hanafiah (al-Syarkhasi and Ibn Abidin), Malikiyah (Sheikh Ilyas), Syafi'iah (Imam al-Nawawi and Ibn Allan), Hanabilah (Imam al-Bahuti), and al-Zhahiriah (Ibn Hazm) stating that the law of fulfilling a promise is not obligatory in terms of positive law (qaḍa'). The law of fulfilling a promise is recommended and seen as a noble character. A party who promises another party to buy something, qarḍ, or donate something is not able to be legally forced to fulfill his/her promise, but he/she is encouraged to fulfill it. The basis of this willingness is stated in QS. al-Shaf (61): 2-3 stating that it is a big sin for someone who says something to another party but the person concerned does not carry it out. A hadith as narrated by Imam Bukhari and Imam Muslim from Abu Hurairah states that one of the characteristics of hypocrisy is the person who breaks his/her promise. 35 Mahmud Fahd Ahmad al-Amuri in detail explained the opinions of Ulama who argued that the law of fulfilling a promise is sunnah (not binding). Imam al-Sarkhasi (Ulama of Hanafiah) explained that promises that are not mu'allaq with conditions or causes are not mulzim (binding); the law of fulfilling promises that are absolute is sunnah (suggested). Ibn Abidin (an Ulama of Hanafiah) explained that promises are not mulzim, so they are not legally binding; however, fulfilling a promise is the best deed. Sheikh 'Ilyas and Ibn Rushd (the Ulama of Malikiyah) argued that promises are not mulzim and, among the Ulama (Malikiah), there is no ikhtilāf (disagreement) about the advice to fulfill promises (not binding). Imam al-Nawawi (the Ulama of Shafi'iah) explained that Ulama have different opinions about the nature of promises as well as the law to fulfil them. Imam Abu Hanifah and Imam al-Shafi'i (and most of ulama) agreed that promises are not mulzim; the law to fulfilling it is recommended; the law of breaking a promise is makruh and breaking a promise is not sinful. Meanwhile, other Ulama agreed that the law of fulfilling a promise is obligatory; promises are mulzim. Ibn 'Allan (the Ulama of Shafi'ah) argued that the law of fulfilling promises is sunnah  Hasanuddin, et.al. DOI: 10.22373/sjhk.v7i2.17601 http://jurnal.ar-raniry.ac.id/index.php/samarah 1276 (mandub) -not obligatory. Ibn Hajar (the Ulama of Shafi'ah) citing the opinion of al-Muhallab argued that the law of fulfilling a promise is ordered and recommended -not obligatory. Imam al-Buhuti (a Hanabilah ulama) viewed that promises are not mulzim and the law of fulfilling them is not obligatory as explained by Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal who equated the law of promises with the law of grants before qabḍ. Imam Ibn Hazm (the Ulama of Zahiriah) argued that the law of breaking a promise is makruh (disapproved); and fulfilling promises is a noble character whether the conditions promised have been fulfilled or not. 36 Meanwhile, a number of Ulama such as are Sa'id Ibn Umar, Ibn Syubrumah, Ibn al-Syath al-Maliki, Ibn al-Arabi, Ishaq Ibn Rahawaih, al-Ghazali, and al-Jashash obliged to fulfill any forms of promise. Sa'id Ibn Umar as narrated by Imam al-Bukhari argued that the law of fulfilling promises is binding. Ibn Syubrumah and Ibn Rushd argued that all promises are binding so that they must be fulfilled by the promised party and the promised party can be forced to fulfill them. Ibn al-Syath al-Maliki (Qasim Ibn Abd Allah) argued that promises are binding so that the law fulfilling them is absolutely obligatory. Muhammad Abd Allah Ibn al-'Arabi viewed that the valid opinion is the opinion stating that every promise must be fulfilled in every condition except for an excuse (udzur). Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali believed that promises must be fulfilled unless with an excuse (udzur). Imam Abu Bakr al-Razi al-Jashash in interpreting QS al-Shaf: 2, explained that every promise must be fulfilled because saying (promise) without realization is included into a disgraceful act forbidden by Allah. 37 The obligation to fulfill promises legally (qadhā'iyan) is based upon QS. al-Shaf: 2-3. Imam al-Qurafi explained that breaking a promise means breaking QS. al-Shaf: 2-3. Another legal basis is the hadith mentioning that breaking a promise is forbidden and includes a form of hypocrisy and the hadith narrated by Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Ibn Mas'ud ra states that the Prophet said: "A promise is a debt;" and debts must be paid.

Progressiveness of Islamic Economic Law
Some Ulama criticized the use of QS. al-Shaf: 2-3 as the basis for the obligation to keep the promises. QS. al-Shaf: 2-3, as explained by Imam Qatadah and Imam Dhahak, is a verse explaining Jihad for a people in which some of them call for jihad but they themselves do not do it. Therefore, the verse only applies to these people. Ibn Hazm argued that QS. al-Shaf: 2-3 deals with obligatory matters such as promising to fulfill obligations. Ibn Hazm's opinion is in accordance with the rule of al-'ibrah bi 'umūm al-lafzh la 36 Mahmud Fahd  Mahmud Fahd . Hasanuddin, et.al. DOI: 10.22373/sjhk.v7i2.17601 http://jurnal.ar-raniry.ac.id/index.php/samarah 1277 bi khushush al-sabāb. Therefore, what must be made as 'ibrah is the generality of lafazh. 38 Other Ulama rejected if the hadith about hypocrisy is associated with the law of fulfilling promises. They argued that what is meant in this hadith is khâlish hypocrisy, i.e. statements and attitudes showing themselves embracing Islam and hiding disbelief so that they will be placed in hell. Most of Ulama considered that this hadith has nothing to do with the law on the obligation to fulfill promises. 39 The hadith stating that a promise is a debt (al-'idah dain) as narrated from Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Ibn Mas'ud is a da'if hadith that cannot be used as an argument. Meanwhile, the hadith as narrated from Abu Hurairah in which, among the narrators, there was Ibn Syihab who was underage when Abu Hurairah died so he did not hear it directly from Abu Hurairah. Therefore, Ibn Hazm explained that the hadith was rejected so that it could not be used as a dalil or proof.

Progressiveness of Islamic Economic Law
Meanwhile, some ulama such as Ulama of Hanafiyah, Imam Malik, Imam Sahnun, Imam al-Qurafi, Imam al-Lakhmi, and Ibn Qasim viewed that fulfilling a promise is legally obligatory if associated with certain conditions. 40 The Ulama of Hanafiah stipulated that the law to fulfills a promise is mandatory if the conditions are met because the promise is binding. 41 Ibn Rusyd argued that conditional promises are legally binding. The state can force the party that promises to fulfill a conditional promise if the conditions have been fulfilled if the person concerned does not carry out the promise voluntarily. 42 Imam Malik, Imam Sahnun, Imam al-Qurafi, Imam al-Lakhmi, and Ibn Qasim argued that the law of fulfilling a conditional promise is obligatory if the specified conditions have been fulfilled with a reason to prevent any harms (daf' al-dharar). 43 The obligation argument avoids harm (daf' al-dharar), avoids uncertainty (gharar), 44 and the party who promises is bound by the promise he/she has made. 45 The decision of Majma' al-Fiqh al-Islami distinguished promises from one party (wa'd) and promises from two parties (muwa'adah). Unilateral promises might be obligatory to be fulfilled (mulzim), while muwa'adah cannot be obligatory because they are similar to contracts that are mustaqbal (musyabihah li al-'aqd al-mudhaf ila al-mustaqbal). However, Muhammad Taqi Uthmani stated that there was a real need (al-hājah) to oblige muwa'adah, especially interstate (bilateral) and international transactions, as well as the issuance of securities. 46 DSN-MUI Fatwa Number 85/DSN-MUI/XII/2012 concerning Promises (Wa'd) in Sharia Financial and Business Transactions states that promises in sharia financial and business transactions are binding (mulzim) in which the person who promises must fulfill them. This obligation is valid if the party who promises is legally competent and has an ability and authority to realize what has been promised and the promise must be made in writing, associated with something (condition) that is not contradicting to sharia, and what is required has been carried out.
The provisions of the fatwa are in line with the opinions of Ulama of Hanafiah, Imam Malik, Imam Sahnun, Ibn Rushd, Imam al-Qurafi, Imam al-Lakhmi, and Ibn Qasim. The consideration is legal certainty so as to avoid gharar (uncertainty) and as an effort to prevent any disputes (daf' al-dharar).  Hasanuddin, et.al. DOI: 10.22373/sjhk.v7i2.17601 http://jurnal.ar-raniry.ac.id/index.php/samarah 1279 28/DSN-MUI/III/2002 on Currency Trading (Sharf) contains a provision that forward transaction is unlawful except for the forward agreement mechanism in which the parties promise each other to trade in currency (bai' al-sharf) to be carried out in the future. This fatwa is also related to DSN-MUI fatwa Number 96/DSN-MUI/IV/2015 on Sharia Hedging Transactions (al-Tahawwuth al-Islami/Islamic Hedging) on Exchange Rates; In this fatwa there are provisions for a mutual promise (muwa'adah) to carry out spot transactions in the future by agreeing on the currency to be traded, nominal amount, the exchange rate or the calculation of the exchange rate (formula), and the transaction time, for hedging using both 'aqd al-tahawuth al-basith (simple) and 'aqd al-tahawuth al-murakkab schemes (with a spot transaction flow, a forward agreement followed by a spot transaction).

Progressiveness of Islamic Economic Law
If muwa'adah in the contract of musyarakah mutanaqishah is ignored by the LKS and the customer, it means that there is no buying and selling of the LKS' capital portion. Then, there will be no reduction in the LKS' capital portion and the contract automatically loses its special characteristics, i.e. the reduction in the LKS' capital portion due to gradual purchases made by customers. Also, if the LKS does not want to grant mahal al-manfa'ah to the customer (in the contract of IMBT) because the promise is seen not mulzim, then it is suspected or should be suspected that the customer is disappointed and it will create a dispute (niza') between the LKS and the customer. Similarly, if muwa'adah is not carried out by the parties for spot transactions through forward agreements and hedging (al-tahawuth al-islami), then the party that will buy the foreign currency has the potential to be unable to fulfill his/her obligations in the currency he/she needs. Thus, the DSN-MUI fatwa on wa'd mulzim is an endeavor of the DSN-MUI, which is based on the principles of sadd al-dzari'ah that is to avoid difficulties (daf' al-dharar) including avoiding disputes (daf' al-niza'), and avoiding uncertainty (daf' al-gharar) to realize benefit (dar' al-mafasid wa jalb al-maṣaliḥ).

Compensation for Guarantee Services
Ulama agree that guarantees without wages are allowed and they have different views regarding the law of guarantees with wages (kafalah bi alujrah). Some Ulama allow but some forbid it. Most of Ulama, as explained by al-Syinqithi, viewed that a guarantee in return is a void contract. Al-Khithab in the book of Syarh al-Khithab (4: 242) argued that Ulama have an agreement (la khilaf) regarding the prohibition of kafalah bi al-ujrah/kafalah bi al-ju'l as in sharia there is a provision that guarantees (kafalah), borrowing money (qarḍ), and reputation (jah) should not be done except for the sake of Allah without taking ujrah. Ibn 'Abidin in the book of al-Bahr al-Ra'iq (6: 342) and al-Dardir Hasanuddin, et.al. DOI: 10.22373/sjhk.v7i2.17601 http://jurnal.ar-raniry.ac.id/index.php/samarah 1280 in the book of al-Syarh al-Kabir (3:77) argued that the position of guarantor (kafil) is equal with the position of muqridh (read: comparing [qiyas] kafalah contract to qarḍ contract), which is prohibited to receive any compensation. The prohibition is because the compensation for guarantee services is seen as riba (interest). Kafalah contract may only be made in the domain of virtue (tabarru') -not as a part of a business contract (tijarah). Imam Malik in the book of Majma' al-Dhmanat (5: 111) by al-Baghdadi argued that guarantees in return is not seen as a good deed. Ibn 'Irfah stated that guarantees in return are not accepted. Imam Ibn Jarir al-Tabari in his book Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha' (9) also argued that a guarantee in return is a void contract. 47 The prohibition of compensation for the guarantee is based upon several considerations. The kafalah contract is equal with qarḍ contract in which both contracts are included in the domain of tabarru contract; taking compensation for qarḍ is seen as riba, similar with taking compensation for guarantees (as explained by Ibn 'Abidin and al-Dardir). 48 In the perspective of maqashid alshari'ah, Kafalah contracts include the contracts aimed at social good (al-irfaq, al-tawasu'ah, and al-ihsan). 49 The agreement on compensation for guarantees is a legal act violating the maqasid al-shari'ah.  50 This permissibility is as the compensation for the risk (al-mukhatharah) that becomes his/her responsibility. Al-Winsyarisi conveyed the opinion of 'Abdullah al-Qauri regarding the differences of opinion of Ulama regarding the legal status of taking compensation for good name services (al-jah/prestige). 'Abdullah al-Qauri considered the need for a guarantor in expressing his opinion. 51 In this Hasanuddin, et.al. DOI: 10.22373/sjhk.v7i2.17601 http://jurnal.ar-raniry.ac.id/index.php/samarah 1281 case, the guarantor needs living expenses (income [guarantee fee]. With masyaqqah he/she experiences, and the guarantor requires travel expenses [mas'a], and the agreement on compensation for guarantee services is then seen permissible

Progressiveness of Islamic Economic Law
Historically, the prohibition of guarantee compensation is acceptable since it is solely hoping for a compensation from Allah. However, the current conditions are different because of the guarantee agreement (kafalah) as a part of corporate businesses. Guarantee is a condition that must be fulfilled by the cooperative receiving the financing. Under these conditions, it is impossible to guarantee for free. The impossibility of taking guarantee services is an opinion that is not in line with the current reality. In accordance with the maṣlāḥah principle and the principle that "fatwas can be changed due to the changing circumstances of the times," compensation for guarantee services (business activities) is permissible then. 52 Nazih Hammad explained that there is no prohibition on changing a benevolent contract (wadi'ah, kafalah, wakalah, and hawalah) into a business contract (ijarah and ju'alah) provided that the parties accept it voluntarily (alridha) and are the part of the agreement (contract). 53 He allowed the compensation for guarantee services with analogous arguments (qiyas) against the opinion of ulama who allow compensation for obedient work and getting closer to Allah. 54 Hanafiah, Malikiah, Hanabilah, and Syafi'iah scholars allow compensation for compulsory work because it is done to get closer to Allah and as a form of obedience to Allah such as in services for teaching the Qur'an, calling for prayer, and praying priests. explained the opinion of Hanafiah Ulama that allows compensation for teaching fiqh. Most of the scholars who allow compensation for the services of washing and shrouding the corpse. Ibn Taimiah allowed compensation for witness services (syahadah). Syafi'iyyah scholars allow compensation (ujrah) for work including fardhu 'ain, namely compensation for searching for missing (drowning) people. and teaching services for Surah al-Fatihah.
Al-Syeikh al-Khafif argued that the opinion of the Ulama prohibiting to take compensation for guarantee services is an opinion that is not based on verses of Al-Qur'an and hadith (directly), but through reason known as the analogy method/qiyas (equating kafalah with qarḍ). He emphasized that permissibility to take the compensation for guarantee services is included in the domain of ijtihad based upon al-'urf (good habits in society). Since the opinion Progressiveness of Islamic Economic Law Hasanuddin, et.al. DOI: 10.22373/sjhk.v7i2.17601 http://jurnal.ar-raniry.ac.id/index.php/samarah 1285 The history of using gold and silver as currency followed the state policies. The Jahiliyah Arab community used to use gold Dinar (Heraclius Dinar [Emperor of Byzantium]) and silver Dirham (Persian Baghli Dirham). The people of Mecca at that time used money made of metal in the form of tibr (gold that had not been minted as currency). People at that time used gold Dinars and silver Dirhams based on the weight -not the amount because the scale of the money at that time was not the same. One (1) Baghli Dirham was equal to 8 Daniq; 1 Dirham Thabari was equal to ½ Dirham Baghli, i.e. 4 Daniq; 1 Rithl was equal to 12 Uqiyah; and 1 Uqiyah was equal to 40 Dirhams. 1 Nishsh/Nasysy was equal to half Uqiyah, i.e. 20 Dirhams; 1 Nuwah was equal to 5 Dirhams; 1 Daniq was equal to 1/6 Dirham; 1 Qirath was equal to ½ Daniq and 1 Habbah was equal to the weight of 1 moderate sya'ir peanut. The use of Dinar and Dirham as money did not differentiate the forms, both printed (madhrub) and stamped (masbuk) money with gold or silver (money), which was still in the form of grains (tibr). All of these forms of money were used on the basis that these objects were gold and silver and not required to be in a special form as official money.
Umar Ibn al-Khaththab wrote the words "Bismillah," "al-Hamdu lillah," "Bismi Rabbi," and "Muhammad Rasulullah" (as Islamic symbols) on Dinar and Dirham originating from Byzantium and Persia. A number of historians stated that the first person to issue Dinar and Dirham to be enforced in the Islamic region (State) was Abd al-Malik Ibn Marwan (Khalifah of the Umayyads coming to power after the phase of al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun) in 74 H as a response to the governors who made their own currency. Several governors who made the money included al-Hajjaj in 75 H making Dirham Baghli; Abdullah Ibn Zubair making his own dinar by affixing his name on dinar (i.e. Abdullah Amir al-Mu'minin) and Mush'ab Ibn Zubair (Governor of Iraq) making a special dirham.
The expert's explanation showed a change in Islamic literature regarding money. Muslims accepted Dinar and Dirham from Byzantium and Persia as money. Caliph Umar Ibn al-Khatthab affixed some Islamic symbols on money coming from Byzantium and Persia; Caliph Abd al-Malik Ibn Marwan unified currencies created by a number of governors of the Umayyad caliphs who minted local money ('umlah) and Abd al-Malik Ibn Marwan made his own gold Dinar in 75 H.
In Indonesia, the Central Bank (the authorized institution) has issued Rupiah currency made of metal and paper -not as money with intrinsic value (gold and silver) or not using gold and silver as uṣul al-nuqud or underlying of the money issued. Therefore, it implicitly shows that gold is not money (nuqud) and not used as a medium of exchange. In this regard, the DSN-MUI has viewed community is accustomed to do such the buying and selling model, either in taqsith (installments) or on ta'jil (tough). It then arises a question regarding the permissibility of such buying and selling model. The fatwa has been issued to provide guidelines for non-cash gold transactions.

Something Flat and Changed
The In the chronological context, it can be seen that the view of DSN has changed on the status of promises. At the beginning, the DSN viewed that promises were not binding, and then they became binding in the next fatwa. This showed two things about the dynamics of Islamic law as seen from its interaction with business development and the consequences of changing these provisions. This change has corrected the previous opinion regarding the promise or not caused by the last fatwa Number 85 on binding promises not mentioning a clause correcting the previous fatwa.
In terms of the compensation in the guarantee contract (kafālah), the DSN is consistent. Fatwa Number 11 of 2000 concerning kafālah has stated that compensation is permissible. Similarly, fatwa Number 57 of 2007 concerning letters of credit with kafālah bi al-ujrah contracts explicitly mentions the permissibility of compensation. This is interpreted as the consistency of the fatwa regarding the permissibility of compensation in guarantee. The fatwa that appeared later has emphasized the provisions of the previous fatwa, which were less strict in allowing compensation in guarantee.
DSN is consistent in regulating the buying and selling of gold. In fatwa Number 28 of 2002 on al-ṣarf, it is emphasized that buying and selling of currency must be done in cash and if the currency is similar in type, then the value is equal. Also, fatwa Number 77 of 2010 concerning non-cash buying and selling of gold has emphasized that buying and selling gold as currency must be done in cash and its value. However, this fatwa provides a new norm regarding the sale and purchase of gold as a commodity that can be done in installments (not in cash). In this fatwa, the function of gold is considered to have shifted from currency to traded commodity goods.
The existence of flat and changed provisions shows the effectiveness of the concept of murā'at al-'ilal wa al-maṣāliḥ. The law follows developments and considers the benefit. The binding promises are to anticipate the parties to avoid their obligations and to provide legal certainty. Practices in Sharia finance has also proven the binding promises because if one of the parties does not carry out his/her promise, he/she will be subject to sanctions to pay the losses. 61 These findings support the research of Saeed, Aziz, and Maksum which states that formal legal aspects still dominate fatwas. However, fatwas have attempted to respond the economic needs by providing solutions to modern transaction practices that legal status is debatable in fiqh scholars. This is different from the findings of Laldin which states that Islamic financial products copy conventional products.

Conclusion
The murā'at al-'ilal wa al-maṣāliḥ approach starts from the principle stating that every text of the Qur'an and hadith related to economic activities has a legal cause ('illat) and that cause can be known through ijtihad (ma'qulāt alma'na). From this approach, it is proven to be able to dynamize law and respond to community needs. This can be seen from the fatwas issued by the National Sharia Council of the Ulama Council such as binding promises (wa'd and muwā'adah), permissibility of compensation for guarantee services, and buying and selling gold not in cash. This fatwa has provided an answer to the public's need for transaction law because there are some different views among the ulama regarding its legal status. DSN has chosen the legal opinion that fulfilling conditional promises is obligatory with the considerations of avoiding harm (sadd al-dzari'ah), avoiding disputes (daf' al-niza'), and avoiding uncertainty (daf' al-garar). Compensation for guarantee services is also based on modern business processes requiring guarantees for business activities. While, the permissibility of buying and selling gold not in cash is due to a shift in the use of gold. In the past, non-cash buying and selling of gold was forbidden because of the status of gold at that time as currency or a value standard for money, but now gold is used as a commodity to be traded. Due to the change in status, gold status becomes goods like other goods that can be traded on credit. The law then moves by looking at the existing benefits and both community and financial institutions can implement these transactions. The implementation of murā'at al-'ilal wa al-maṣāliḥ implicate the satuts of law that there are things fixed and changeable. Because 'illat is permanent and can be translated for different contexts and circumstances. The law can change when