Critical Rationalism, Falsifiability, and the Open Society: A Popperian Framework for the Post-Truth Crisis

Abstract

This article examines the relevance of Karl Popper’s critical rationalism and his conception of the open society for understanding the epistemic and political conditions of the post-truth era. Rather than treating falsificationism as a procedure for verifying every public claim, the article interprets Popper’s philosophy as an ethic of fallibilism, public criticism, and institutional correction. The study employs qualitative library research through a critical reading of Popper’s major works, supported by contemporary scholarship on post-truth, misinformation, digital polarization, and public reason. The analysis argues that post-truth conditions are sustained not only by the circulation of false information but also by weakened norms of evidence, declining trust in institutions, and the insulation of political identities from criticism. Popper’s falsifiability criterion is relevant primarily as a model of critical testing within scientific inquiry, while critical rationalism offers a broader orientation for evaluating public claims provisionally and revisably. The concept of the open society complements this orientation by emphasizing institutions that protect dissent, transparency, error correction, and nonviolent political change. The article concludes that a Popperian response to post-truth should not be understood as a simple fact-checking method, but as a framework for strengthening public criticism, epistemic humility, and institutional accountability.